Uber Technologies, Inc. (UBER)vs Salesforce, Inc. (CRM)

Quick verdict

The widest gap between these two sits in shareholder distributions: Salesforce returned a 16.44% buyback yield in the twelve months to July 2026, against 4.46% at Uber, and adds a 0.71% dividend on a 15.68% payout ratio where Uber pays nothing. That matters because both companies now convert revenue into cash at a similar clip — free cash flow of $15.2bn at Salesforce and $10.1bn at Uber — but only one is currently routing that cash back to holders at scale. Elsewhere the scorecard is remarkably level: valuation, growth, quality and momentum all come out too close to call, leaving the overall score tied at 3-3. Uber takes the balance-sheet factor on lower leverage; Salesforce takes income. Note that Uber's net income of $9.6bn sits well above its $6.7bn operating profit, so earnings-based ratios were withheld.

At-a-glance comparison

Business model and revenue mix

Two very different routes to the same industry label. Uber operates ride-hailing and food-delivery marketplaces plus a freight brokerage, taking a cut of gross bookings across a high-frequency, physical-world network; that model produced $55.2bn of revenue in the twelve months to June 2026 from a base of 2.04bn shares. Salesforce sells cloud-based customer-relationship-management software with attached data, analytics and AI tools on subscription, generating $43.9bn in the twelve months to July 2026 across 823m shares. The revenue-recognition difference explains much of what follows: Salesforce books gross subscription fees at a 77.28% gross margin, while Uber's marketplace accounting and physical cost base leave a 12.13% operating margin. Salesforce is the larger company by market capitalisation at $213.3bn versus $154.7bn, despite the smaller top line.

Valuation

Neither side wins on price, and the multiples explain why. On sales, Uber is cheaper at 2.8 times trailing revenue against 4.86 times for Salesforce, but the two converge almost exactly on book value — 5.66 times versus 5.56 times — and on enterprise value to EBITDA, 21.84 times against 23.89 times, both at the 4 September 2026 close. Free cash flow yields are close too: 7.1% at Salesforce, 6.54% at Uber. Salesforce trades on 23.74 times trailing earnings; Uber's P/E was withheld because non-operating items lift its net income well above operating profit, so the ratio would not describe the underlying business. Salesforce's 0.1 PEG looks arresting but is built on a distorted earnings growth rate, discussed below. The valuation verdict is a genuine tie.

Growth profile

Faster expansion sits with Uber, though not by enough to settle the factor. Revenue compounded at 36.1% a year from fiscal 2020 to fiscal 2025 and at 17.73% a year from fiscal 2022, versus 14.34% from fiscal 2021 and 9.82% from fiscal 2023 at Salesforce, whose latest fiscal year ends in January 2026. The five-year figure for Uber spans the pandemic-depressed 2020 base and should be read as a recovery rate as much as an underlying one. Salesforce's earnings growth needs the same caution in reverse: EPS compounded at 233.65% a year from fiscal 2023, a rate produced by a very low starting point, while the five-year EPS CAGR of 12.23% from fiscal 2021 is the steadier reading. Uber's EPS growth rates are absent from the data.

Profitability and quality

On margins Salesforce is plainly ahead — a 77.28% gross margin, 19.88% operating margin and 21.99% net margin against Uber's 12.13% operating margin, with Uber's net margin withheld for the same non-operating distortion noted earlier. Yet the capital-efficiency reading flips: Uber earns a 15.05% return on invested capital against 9.8% at Salesforce, whose large acquisition-driven asset base dilutes the denominator. Salesforce's 19.38% return on equity is the higher headline, but with a 16.44% buyback yield shrinking the equity base it flatters the comparison; ROIC is the fairer gauge here, and Uber's is the stronger. Uber's return on equity was withheld. With one company winning margins and the other winning returns on capital, the quality verdict lands as a tie rather than a clear call either way.

Balance-sheet risk

Here the two separate, and Uber takes the factor. Against $4.9bn of cash and $12.7bn of total debt at 30 June 2026, Uber's net debt sits at 1.05 times EBITDA, with interest covered 14.5 times by operating profit. Salesforce carries $8.3bn of cash against $39.3bn of debt at 31 July 2026, lifting net debt to 3.03 times EBITDA and trimming interest cover to 8.92 times — still comfortable, but a materially heavier load. Both report an identical current ratio of 0.84, below one, which is common for subscription and marketplace businesses that collect from customers ahead of settling payables and deferred obligations. Salesforce's larger free cash flow of $15.2bn gives it room to service that debt, but on the leverage metrics themselves Uber holds the cleaner position.

Price performance and shareholder returns

Cash returned to shareholders is where Salesforce wins outright. In the twelve months to July 2026 it paid $1.84 per share, a 0.71% dividend yield on a modest 15.68% payout ratio, and repurchased stock equivalent to a 16.44% buyback yield — a rate that has pulled the share count down to 823m. Uber pays no dividend at all, with a zero payout ratio, and its 4.46% buyback yield is the entirety of its distribution. Both fund these programmes from real cash: $10.1bn of free cash flow at Uber and $15.2bn at Salesforce, supporting free cash flow yields of 6.54% and 7.1% respectively. For an investor who wants cash in hand rather than reinvestment, the gap is not marginal — it is the clearest single distinction on this page.

Which stock fits which investor

Style tags land on blend for both, and the overall score is level at 3-3, so the choice turns on which factor matters most to the holder. Growth-led investors are pointed towards Uber: 17.73% three-year and 36.1% five-year revenue compounding, plus a 15.05% ROIC, outpace Salesforce's 9.82% and 14.34%. Income-focused investors are pointed towards Salesforce, the only one of the pair paying a dividend and running a 16.44% buyback yield. Quality screens also favour Uber, largely on that ROIC and its 1.05 times net-debt-to-EBITDA. Value is a tie — Uber is cheaper on sales at 2.8 times, Salesforce marginally cheaper on book at 5.56 times and better on free cash flow yield at 7.1%. Those wanting reported margin strength will still prefer Salesforce's 19.88% operating margin.

• Value: Too close to call
• Growth: UBER
• Income: CRM
• Quality: UBER

Frequently asked questions

Which is the cheaper share on the numbers?

It depends on the yardstick, which is why valuation is scored a tie. At the 4 September 2026 close Uber trades on 2.8 times trailing sales versus 4.86 times for Salesforce, but Salesforce is fractionally cheaper on book value (5.56 times against 5.66 times), on EV/EBITDA (23.89 against 21.84 for Uber) the edge reverses, and Salesforce offers the higher free cash flow yield at 7.1% versus 6.54%.

Why is there no P/E ratio for Uber?

Uber's net income of $9.6bn in the twelve months to June 2026 sits well above its reported operating profit of $6.7bn, meaning a large share of the bottom line came from non-operating items. Earnings-based measures — the trailing P/E, net margin and return on equity — were therefore withheld as not interpretable. Salesforce's trailing P/E of 23.74 is shown.

Which company carries more debt?

Salesforce. At 31 July 2026 it held $39.3bn of total debt against $8.3bn of cash, giving net debt of 3.03 times EBITDA and interest cover of 8.92 times. Uber's $12.7bn of debt and $4.9bn of cash at 30 June 2026 equate to 1.05 times EBITDA with 14.5 times interest cover. Both report the same 0.84 current ratio.

Does either company pay a dividend?

Only Salesforce, which paid $1.84 per share over the twelve months to July 2026 — a 0.71% yield on a 15.68% payout ratio. Uber pays no dividend and has a zero payout ratio, returning cash solely through buybacks at a 4.46% yield, well below Salesforce's 16.44%.

Is Salesforce's 0.1 PEG ratio as attractive as it looks?

It should be read with care. The PEG rests on EPS compounding of 233.65% a year from fiscal 2023, a rate produced by an unusually low starting point rather than by ongoing momentum. The five-year EPS CAGR from fiscal 2021 of 12.23% is the steadier figure, and revenue growth of 9.82% over three years is more modest still.

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